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Abstract
Background: The commercial poultry industry in United Kingdom (UK) is worth an estimated
£3.4 billion at retail value, producing over 174 million birds for consumption per year. An epidemic
of any poultry disease with high mortality or which is zoonotic, such as avian influenza virus (AIV),
would result in the culling of significant numbers of birds, as seen in the Netherlands in 2003 and
Italy in 2000. Such an epidemic would cost the UK government millions of pounds in compensation
costs, with further economic losses through reduction of international and UK consumption of
British poultry. In order to better inform policy advisers and makers on the potential for a large
epidemic in GB, we investigate the role that interactions amongst premises within the British
commercial poultry industry could play in promoting an AIV epidemic, given an introduction of the
virus in a specific part of poultry industry in Great Britain (GB).
Results: Poultry premises using multiple slaughterhouses lead to a large number of premises being
potentially connected, with the resultant potential for large and sometimes widespread epidemics.
Catching companies can also potentially link a large proportion of the poultry population. Critical
to this is the maximum distance traveled by catching companies between premises and whether or
not between-species transmission could occur within individual premises. Premises closely linked
by proximity may result in connections being formed between different species and or sectors
within the industry.
Conclusion:  Even quite well-contained epidemics have the potential for geographically
widespread dissemination, potentially resulting in severe logistical problems for epidemic control,
and with economic impact on a large part of the country. Premises sending birds to multiple
slaughterhouses or housing multiple species may act as a bridge between otherwise separate
sectors of the industry, resulting in the potential for large epidemics. Investment into further data
collection and analyses on the importance of industry structure as a determinant for spread of AIV
would enable us to use the results from this study to contribute to policy on disease control.
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Background
The GB commercial poultry industry is an important
industry to the British government, the consumer and
farmers alike. Worth an estimated £3.4 billion at retail
value, producing over 174 million birds for consumption
per year [1], poultry diseases are of widespread interest,
both from the point-of-view of understanding different
poultry farming methods [2-4], and in terms of studying
the potential impact of different diseases on poultry [5-7].
However, our knowledge of how poultry farms in GB are
connected to each other by the movement of people and
equipment is more limited. This is essential for effective
prevention and control for potential outbreaks of diseases
transmitted by the movement of people and equipment
between farms within the commercial poultry industry.
Diseases spread in such a way include avian influenza
viruses (AIV), Newcastle disease virus (NDV), Salmonella
and Campylobacter species. Motivated by recent outbreaks
of AIV in the UK and across the world [8], we consider
here how AIV may transmit between poultry farms in GB
by the movement of people and equipment.
Avian influenza viruses (AIV) were first described in the
late nineteenth century by Perroncito [9]. They are highly
contagious viral infections that can affect avian species as
well as other species such as pigs [7], cats [10] and
humans [11]. High pathogenic strains of the virus (HPAI)
have potentially high transmissibility and high mortality
rates in poultry [12-14]. Although low pathogenic strains
of the virus (LPAI) have a lower mortality rate, this renders
them harder to detect, increasing the chances of silent
spread. Furthermore, the H5 and H7 subtypes of LPAI
have the ability to mutate into high-pathogenic strains as
seen in 1999 in Italy, when H7N1 mutated from LPAI to
HPAI [15]. In recent years, the H5N1 strain of the virus
has gradually spread westward in countries located
between Hong Kong (2003) and GB (2007) and it is likely
that AIV is endemic in poultry in many parts of the world
[16].
In previous studies, AIV outbreak data from other coun-
tries have been analysed and models have been developed
to describe the spread of the virus [13,16,17]. Recent pub-
lications have concentrated on the development of simu-
lation models [8,17] but have not described in detail the
contact structures within the industry over which trans-
mission could occur. As it is unclear to what extent trans-
mission parameters from other countries can be applied
to models that include detailed industry structure, we use
an analytical approach that considers the importance of
the contact structures that occur within the poultry indus-
try, with respect to the potential for disease transmission.
In the absence of robust estimates of transmission param-
eters, this approach can be used to identify combinations
of parameters that could result in a large epidemic, and
critically, under those scenarios identifying key demo-
graphic features which lead into determining when infec-
tious diseases may spread, as has previously been done in
analyses of the sheep and cattle industries [18-20].
In this study, the structure of the poultry industry in GB is
investigated using the poultry network database collected
and maintained by the Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). While there have been no
recent large outbreaks of AIV in GB, HPAI, LPAI, NDV,
Campylobacter and Salmonella are all transmitted via the
faeco-oral route, and so we infer likely routes of transmis-
sion for AIV by the transmission of these diseases in prior
outbreaks. The presence of slaughterhouse personnel or
equipment on a premises during depopulation has been
implicated as a risk factor for infection of Campylobacter to
remaining birds [21]. Slaughterhouses have also been
implicated as a key checkpoint for the detection of patho-
gens such as Campylobacter [22] and Salmonella [23,24],
and in case of poor biosecurity could also result in the
spread of pathogens between premises where dirty equip-
ment is reused. Catching companies (teams of people that
catch birds for slaughter) have also been implicated in
Campylobacter  transmission [25], and within company
spread includes fomite transmission as well as transmis-
sion via personnel, which is considered a major route of
transmission of avian infection [2,26]. In addition, "local
spread" may be important. Local spread has been identi-
fied in transmission of AIV between poultry flocks in the
Netherlands [13,27] and environmental factors were
highlighted by the literature review as being a potentially
important factor for transmission of avian influenza virus
between farms [2,6,12]. Such factors include the presence
and circulation of wild birds. In this study we considered
the effects of the presence and circulation of wild birds on
the transmission of avian influenza in the poultry net-
work in GB only in the context of "local transmission", i.e.
multiple premises infected from the same wildlife source.
By considering associations amongst sub-populations
defined by their interactions, e.g. associations with the
same catching companies, slaughterhouses, common
ownership or by "local spread", we determine the extent
to which industry structures might influence the demo-
graphic and geographic extent of a potential AIV epidemic
in the GB poultry industry. Improvement of our under-
standing of how poultry premises are potentially con-
nected will also identify where further data collection is
necessary.
Results
Network construction and properties
The analysis of the poultry industry was restricted to the
principle commercial species, i.e. to premises housing tur-
keys, chickens, ducks and geese. Premises housing fewer
than 50 birds are not included in the analysis as suchBMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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premises are not required to register their birds. Premises
with missing location data are also excluded from the
analyses. Contact mechanisms between premises were
categorised into people, fomites, vehicles and environ-
mental factors, as shown in Table 1[2,15,21,25,28]. These
were then organised into their relevance to sub-popula-
tions within the poultry industry that may connect poul-
try premises that they are associated with. These sub-
populations were identified as:
▪ Slaughterhouses, whose vehicles are used to collect birds
from farms before slaughter
▪ Catching companies responsible for catching birds
before they go to slaughter
▪ Egg collectors who visit multiple farms in one shift
▪ Feed companies responsible for delivering feed to
premises
▪ Multi-site companies, whose personnel and vehicles
may visit multiple sites belonging to the same company
▪ Farms that are geographically close
Feed lorries and egg collectors have not been included
here as data on these potential transmission routes was
not available for analysis at the time of study. Contact
data for the remaining transmission mechanisms were
used to construct representations of contact structures
occurring within the commercial poultry industry in GB.
The collection of contact data was targeted at commercial
poultry premises housing a minimum of 1000 birds, as
smaller premises are more likely to catch and slaughter
their own birds. From a target population of approxi-
mately 9075 premises (the number of premises housing
>999 birds according to the GB poultry register), a sample
of 4441 poultry premises was included and potentially
infectious links between premises could occur as a result
of premises using the same slaughterhouse, catching com-
pany, or belonging to the same multi-site company. Local
spread was also included to represent environmental
transmission. The sample used was taken from the poultry
network database, which has been designed to show the
links and movements between premises that either send
birds to slaughter, use catching companies or belong to a
multi-site company. The database was not designed to
give population data and therefore cannot be used to rep-
resent an accurate cross section of the GB poultry industry.
The database does however give an accurate representa-
tion of the potential links between premises that do fit the
above criteria.
Of the premises included in the sample, 2973 premises
use identifiable slaughterhouses (Figure 1A), 707
Table 1: Potential between farm transmission routes of avian influenza virus.
Vehicles People Fomites Environment
Litter disposal Catchers and Thinners Catching equipment Wildfowl
Catching Drivers Containers Water and Feed
Disposal and replacement Cleaning teams Pallets Airborne (dust)
Cleaning Artificial Insemination Teams Culling equipment Flying insects
Dead bird collection Area Managers Workman's clothes Game birds (shows)
Imports Farm staff Dead bird collecting
Hatching egg collection Dead bird collectors Holding station
Feed delivery Vets Raw feed Material
Visiting
Vaccination
Farm
Transmission routes are broken down into sub-categories, which are then ranked in order of potential risk of acting as a transmission route of 
disease, from most important to least important.BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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premises use identifiable catching companies (Figure 1B)
and 1016 have company affiliations. Premises associated
with a third party (slaughterhouse, catching company or
multi-site company) are assumed to be potentially con-
nected to any other premises associated with the same
third party. Data are stored in the poultry network data-
base. Data in the network database were compared with
the GB Poultry Register (GBPR) to look for biases. The
GBPR contains information about all poultry premises
housing 50 or more birds.
Industry demographics
Based on a list of abattoirs licensed to slaughter poultry,
maintained by the Food Standards Agency (FSA), it is esti-
mated that over 90% of slaughterhouse through-put (by
number of birds) is accounted for in the network data-
base. Further, the spatial distribution of slaughterhouses
and customers in the network database is similar to that
of the overall GB population [Jason Gittins, pers. comm.].
However, the number of premises in the network data-
base that are recorded as having sent birds to slaughter
represents only 13% of the number of premises in the
GBPR, implying that larger premises are better repre-
sented in the network database. The number of customers
per slaughterhouse ranges from one to over one thousand
customers, with a median of ten customers (Figure 2).
Over 50% of the identified premises that use catching
companies are comprised of housed broilers (reared for
meat) chickens. This corresponds with expectations that
over 50% of catchers are involved in the broiler chicken
sector [29], though the database is not confirmed to be
complete. The database contains information from 25
individual catching companies. It has been reported that
8 specialist catching companies, included in the database,
account for 50% of the chicken sector [Jason Gittins, pers.
comm.]. As all known large (catching from many
premises) catching companies are included in the data-
base, it is assumed that catching companies that are not
included in the database are small companies that do not
necessarily catch from many premises. For end of lay
hens, most of the larger producers use specialist compa-
Poultry premises (red) using A) Slaughterhouses (yellow), and B) Catching companies (yellow) Figure 1
Poultry premises (red) using A) Slaughterhouses (yellow), and B) Catching companies (yellow).BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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nies including those currently in the database. The
number of catching company customers (over 45 catching
company sites) ranges from one to 192 customers (Figure
3). Of the premises visited by catching companies, fewer
than 2% of premises (12 of 707 premises) are recorded as
using more than one catching company, with no poultry
premises using more than two different catching compa-
nies. The overlap between slaughterhouses is much
greater, with over 30% of premises (913 of 2973
Slaughterhouse customers (poultry premises) against the frequency of slaughterhouses with that many customers Figure 2
Slaughterhouse customers (poultry premises) against the frequency of slaughterhouses with that many customers.
Catching company customers (poultry premises) against the frequency of catching companies with that many customers Figure 3
Catching company customers (poultry premises) against the frequency of catching companies with that many customers.BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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premises) sending birds more than one slaughterhouse
(Figure 4).
A total of 1003 (98.7%) of multi-site premises were
matched to the GBPR. For multi-site sources, premises
were identified as being part of a multi-site company via
questionnaires completed by both individual premises
and company representatives. The legislation requires the
owners of all premises housing 50 or more birds, kept for
commercial purposes, to register their poultry on the
GBPR. We assume that the multi-site data gives a good
representation of the population. The number of premises
per multi-site company ranges from two to 113, with the
median number of premises in a multi-site company
being six.
Contact structures
The contact structure can be viewed as a social network of
potentially infectious links amongst premises, these links
are defined by associations via one or more of the four
potential routes of interaction. Transmission networks
can then be generated by assuming a probability of trans-
mission, p, associated with those links, and then selecting
or discarding them based on whether a random number,
chosen from a uniform distribution from zero to one, is
above or below that value p. The transmission networks
can then be grouped into "components" wherein all
premises within a component can be linked to any other
member. In a transmission network, the size of a compo-
nent is therefore an estimate of the size of an epidemic
should any member of that component become infected,
in the absence of intervention. A giant component (GC) is
the largest component, and therefore the size (calculated
as the number of nodes) of the GC represents an estimate
for the upper bound for the potential size of an epidemic
that starts with a single infected premises and in the
absence of further intervention that would alter the net-
work structure. While intervention will occur as soon as
AIV is detected and therefore an epidemic of this size is
unlikely to ever be reached, nevertheless in other similar
scenarios, drastic increases in GC size has previously been
shown to be a good indicator of when a population is vul-
nerable to a serious epidemic [19].
Contact structure analysis – worst-case scenario
In order to gain an understanding of different parts of the
industry, we have considered the four contact structures
separately. When all contact structures are combined, the
GC constantly covers the majority of premises thus mak-
ing it difficult to determine how the different contact
structures affect the potential for large epidemics. Links
are established between all premises using the same
slaughterhouse, catching company, owner or between
premises that are geographically close (within 3 km of
The number of Slaughterhouses used per poultry premises against the frequency of poultry premises Figure 4
The number of Slaughterhouses used per poultry premises against the frequency of poultry premises.BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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each other). By assuming that all premises within a given
contact structure are potentially connected, we can deter-
mine the worst-case scenario, where no interventions are
made over time. Based on an analysis of movement data
between farms using catching companies and sending
birds to slaughter [Dent, unpub.] links between premises
are not directional. As the probability of disease transmis-
sion occurring was increased, the proportion of premises
in the transmission network GC increased until a maxi-
mum of approximately 2870 (97%) of premises linked by
slaughterhouses, 295 (42%) of premises linked by catch-
ing companies, 113 (11%) of premises linked by owner
and 111 (2%) of premises linked by being geographically
close to one another, was reached for small probabilities
of a link occurring (Figure 5). The GC for the slaughter-
house network noticeably covered a wider area and was
denser than the GCs for the catching company and owner
networks (Figure 6).
Network analysis – removal of key players
A "key player" can be defined as an individual member of
the network whose removal has a major impact on reduc-
ing the size of a potential epidemic, or equivalently the
size of the GC [30]. Here, key players are premises that
link otherwise separate components, such as poultry
premises that are the only links between companies using
separate slaughterhouses or the slaughterhouse linking
the most premises.
The three premises that use the most slaughterhouses
(two using seven different slaughterhouses and one using
eight) were removed from the network. However, the size
of the GC remained close to 2870 showing that this had
only a minor effect on the worst-case epidemic. Removal
of premises from the network represents movement bans
that are imposed during an outbreak. These results suggest
that targeting surveillance or imposing movement bans at
highly connected premises alone would not necessarily
have a large impact on the potential size of an epidemic.
Removal of the slaughterhouse with the largest number of
customers (1208 customers) resulted in the number of
premises sending birds to slaughter to fall by 883 (29%)
premises, suggesting that if a large slaughterhouse were to
be involved in an outbreak, there is some justification in
spending money on forward and backward tracings as
well as the local protection and surveillance zone that is
required.
Sensitivity analysis
Relative importance of different contact structures
The proportion of premises not connected to any other
premises i.e. with zero degree, is significantly less (p-value
< 0.01 (ANOVA)) for premises connected by slaughter-
house than for those connected by catching company or
by owner. Furthermore, as the probability of a link occur-
ring increases, the proportion of zero-degree premises
drops significantly more quickly for premises connected
Proportions of premises contained in the Giant Component (GC) for each transmission route, for probability of a link occur- ring between connected premises varied between p = 0 and p = 0.2 Figure 5
Proportions of premises contained in the Giant Component (GC) for each transmission route, for probability of a link occur-
ring between connected premises varied between p = 0 and p = 0.2.BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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by slaughterhouses (p-value = 0.028 (ANOVA)) than for
premises connected by other potential transmission
routes. This implies that individual premises are much
more likely to be connected to other premises via the
slaughterhouse route than any other route, and as the
probability of spread via each route increases, the number
of premises connected to at least one other premises
increases more quickly for premises linked via slaughter-
houses than for other routes. Although this suggests
slaughterhouses are relatively more important than catch-
ing companies and owners in terms of the number of
premises that they are likely to connect, it does not imply
that they are more likely to spread disease, as these results
do not take into account the quantitative probability of
transmission via each route.
The role of premises using multiple slaughterhouses
According to the available contact data, the owners of
poultry premises send birds to up to eight different
slaughterhouses though according to Gittins [ADAS, pers.
comm.] only a small number of single species farms
would truly send birds to more than one slaughterhouse
at any one time. When the number of slaughterhouses
associated with a premises is restricted to one, the maxi-
mal size of the GC in the slaughterhouse transmission
network is reduced to 970 (32.6%) premises. By reducing
the number of slaughterhouse that premises can send
birds to, we are able to comment on the impact that
premises housing multiple species have on the potential
for disease transmission.
Treating multi-species sites as separate epidemiological units
In the preliminary analyses of the contact structures
described in this study, we made an assumption that
catching teams within a catching company are able to
catch from any farm that is associated with that company,
and birds can be sent from a poultry premises to any
slaughterhouse associated with that premises. This
assumption may over estimate the number of contacts
within the industry as catching teams and slaughterhouses
often process only one species and/or production type e.g.
spent chicken layers and meat chicken are not necessarily
processed at the same slaughterhouse. Under the assump-
tion that different species cannot be connected by slaugh-
terhouse or catching company, multi-species sites can be
treated as separate epidemiological units that are con-
nected by location and company.
Properties of the contact structures are sensitive to the
assumption that connections are likely to occur between
Location of poultry premises contained within the GC for premises connected by A) Catching Company, B) Slaughterhouse C)  Owner Figure 6
Location of poultry premises contained within the GC for premises connected by A) Catching Company, B) Slaughterhouse C) 
Owner. With between species transmission. Premises plotted on a 100 km Grid, for probability of a link occurring between 
two premises equal to 0.2.BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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different species and between different production-types
within a species. This is shown by the fall in the size of the
GC to 1603 (53.9%) of premises connected by slaughter-
house and to 102 (14.4%) of premises connected by
catching company when between species transmission is
not assumed (Figure 7). Furthermore, when we assume
that different species are not processed together, we see a
drop in the degree (number of links to other premises) of
each premises. The mean degree size falls from 18.12 to
8.33 links and from 504.95 to 28.64 links for premises
connected by catching companies and slaughterhouses
respectively, when no between-species transmission
occurs via these routes. As restricting contact between dif-
ferent species causes the number of premises with zero-
degree to rise and the size of maximum degree to fall
(Table 2), we can expect the basic reproduction number
R0 for a disease to also fall if between species transmission
can be controlled or prevented on multi-species sites.
Defining a maximum distance that any catching team can travel 
between two poultry premises
Some catching teams operate over broad regions of GB
[29]. This may occur when the birds to be caught require
specialist catching skills, such as for turkeys because of
their size and weight. In order to determine if the area over
which a catching team operates affects the contact struc-
ture of the poultry network, we restricted the distance over
which a team could operate i.e. the distance that any one
catching team within a company can physically travel
between farms. Radii of different sizes were therefore used
around premises, only allowing links to occur with other
premises within the radii. Restricting this distance reduced
the size of the GC from 295 (41.7%) of premises for no
restrictions to 229 (32.4%) for a restriction of 50 km and
84 (11.9%) of premises for a restriction of 25 km (Figure
8). Evidence of some geographic isolation is found when
the maximum distance is restricted to 50 km; for transmis-
sion networks generated when the probability of trans-
mission via catching companies passes through p = 0.05,
the number of premises visited by a catching team, on
average, takes a rapid jump from below ten to more than
13 premises (Figure 9).
Discussion
By combining available data associated with prior out-
breaks of poultry diseases associated with faeco-oral trans-
mission routes (Table 1) we have constructed possible
contact structures within the poultry industry in GB based
on associations amongst poultry premises using the same
slaughterhouses, catching companies, and belonging to
the same multi-site companies. We have also included
environmental spread in our analyses by assuming that
disease can be transmitted between premises that are geo-
graphically close to each other.
Outbreak data from the Netherlands shows that local
transmission of HPAI played an important role in the
2003 epidemic [13,31]. Boender (2007) suggests that epi-
demic spread is only possible in poultry dense areas of
The Netherlands [31]. In the analyses shown here, only
2% of premises were connected, in the worst case sce-
nario, via local transmission within 3 km of an infected
premises, suggesting that the British poultry industry is
not densely enough populated for local transmission of
the HPAI virus which devastated the Netherlands in 2003.
If one assumes that using the same slaughterhouse com-
pany implies a potential link, up to 97% of premises send-
ing birds to slaughter are potentially connected, which
could translate to almost the entire poultry industry,
assuming that most commercial premises do not slaugh-
ter their birds on site. In contrast, only 42% of premises
using catching companies and 11% of premises belonging
to multi-site companies are potentially linked. Although
this suggests that slaughterhouses potentially link the larg-
est number of premises and therefore have the highest
potential for widespread dissemination of virus, should
virus transmit via this route, the size of the GC was highly
sensitive to the number of slaughterhouses used per
premises. It seems unlikely that over 30% of premises
truly send birds to more than one slaughterhouse, as indi-
cated in the network database. It is possible that when
slaughterhouses were asked to provide a list of customers,
some premises were listed that are no longer active cus-
tomers. This could result in an overestimate in the
number of slaughterhouses used per premises. This sug-
gests that the structure of the industry may be very
Table 2: Difference in degree size for between species and no-between species transmission
Slaughterhouse: 
Between species 
transmission
Slaughterhouse: 
No between species 
transmission
Catching company: 
Between species
transmission
Catching company:  
No between species
transmission
Proportion of zero-degree epidemiological units 0.101 0.310 0.789 0.851
Largest degree 1457 700 223 107
Numbers correspond to number of epidemiological units, and not number of premises. By splitting multi-species premises into separate 
epidemiological units, the number of units associated with catching companies and slaughterhouses rise to 825 and 3418 respectively.BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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dynamic, with premises changing their potential interac-
tions regularly. Thus regular updating of the database
would be necessary if it is to be used for contact tracing
purposes. Further, in the absence of contact data from an
AIV epidemic in GB, we do not know the parameter values
that should be applied to each transmission mechanism
and should therefore take care when comparing outputs,
and it is generally believed that catching company teams,
for example, are a more likely mode of transmission than
slaughterhouses (cf. table 1). We also note that different
research groups have approached this problem in differ-
ent ways. Truscott et al (2007) [8] group movements of
people and equipment together and assume a constant,
density-independent contact rate between premises,
where-as Sharkey et al (2007) [17] do not incorporate the
movement of catching companies in their models but do
consider the probability of transmission via slaughter-
houses to be always greater than that of company move-
ments for example. In adopting either approach,
slaughterhouses remain the most important contact
mechanism in this analysis in terms of the number of
premises that may become infected. Further data collec-
tion is required to determine why the owners of poultry
do not necessarily use local catching companies and
slaughterhouses, and whether putting a smaller limit on
the distance that live poultry can be transported would be
a feasible standard for the industry to set.
The contact structures observed here are well connected
with a high number of links between premises. This
occurs because we have made the assumption that all
premises using the same slaughterhouse, catching com-
pany or belonging to the same multi-site premises are
potentially all connected. This means that targeting sur-
veillance at the premises that use the most number of
slaughterhouses, in particular, will not be beneficial in
preventing or controlling an epidemic as there are other
premises, using more than one slaughterhouse, that are
able to keep the connectedness of the contact structure.
We have shown that removal of the largest slaughterhouse
greatly reduces the number of premises that are con-
nected. While one cannot remove a slaughterhouse from
the industry in real terms, one can target surveillance,
through forward and backward tracings, at all of the
Location of poultry premises contained within the GC for premises connected by A) Catching Company, B) Slaughterhouse Figure 7
Location of poultry premises contained within the GC for premises connected by A) Catching Company, B) Slaughterhouse. 
With no between species transmission. Premises plotted on a 100 km Grid, for probability of a link occurring between two 
premises equal to 0.2.BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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premises that have had recent contact with the slaughter-
house. By ensuring that there is no infection passing
through the largest slaughterhouse, we can be sure that at
least 22% of premises that send birds to slaughter are not
transmitting disease via this mechanism.
Multi-species sites are also potentially important, should
transmission between species on a site be likely, as they
can act as a bridge between different sectors of the poultry
industry. Operating on a species-specific basis at the
slaughterhouse and by the catching company can reduce
the risk of a large epidemic, by reducing the number of
potential contacts made between separate epidemiologi-
cal units. This in turn reduces the R0 of a disease, making
control more manageable. Housing multiple species on
the same site so that species have the potential for interac-
tion, either by being housed in the same building or
through having access to the same feeding or watering
ground for example, may also pose problems at the farm
level as a result of the differences in species susceptibility
to AI viruses. Ducks for example are able to carry both
LPAI and HPAI virus without showing any clinical signs
[2,32]. Although outbreaks of HPAI in commercial ducks
are rare, the ability of ducks to survive infection can
increase the time to detection of an outbreak, and hence
the number of premises potentially infected with an AI
virus. This is particularly dangerous for premises housing
ducks and chickens or turkeys, as ducks can shed high
doses of the virus without any early warning signs. While
further investigation into the range of values of within
flock transmission is important, these analyses underline
the value of good biosecurity at premises level to limit
transmission across species within premises.
Biosecurity measures are not directly accounted for in this
analysis. Under good biosecurity measures, connections
between species and connections between premises, over
which disease can transmit, can be broken. Although
biosecurity levels are difficult to measure, they can be rep-
resented here by a reducing the probability of an infec-
tious link occurring between connected premises. This
would result in a reduction of the number premises in the
GC. The real risk of disease transmission through move-
ments of people, vehicles and equipment should be inves-
tigated further, so that the impact of biosecurity at both
the farm and slaughterhouse level can be simulated.
Conclusion
We have used potential transmission routes of poultry dis-
eases, to identify potential contact structures within the
poultry industry in GB over which AIV may transmit. Few
premises are connected as a result of being geographically
close to one another, which reduces the concern for local
spread of AIV, and limits the validity of applying data
The effect on the number of premises in the GC of restricting the distance that catching companies move between premises to  a) no restriction (red), b) 50 km restriction (green) and c) 25 km restriction (blue) Figure 8
The effect on the number of premises in the GC of restricting the distance that catching companies move between premises to 
a) no restriction (red), b) 50 km restriction (green) and c) 25 km restriction (blue).BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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from the 2003 outbreak in the Netherlands to the GB sit-
uation.
Connections through slaughterhouses potentially links
surprisingly large numbers of premises, over long dis-
tances. Further work as to whether these potential connec-
tions represent real risk, or are just an artefact of the data,
must be investigated. Should it prove true, surveillance
should be targeted at those premises connected to the
largest slaughterhouse in order to prevent disease spread-
ing to a large number of premises. As reducing the dis-
tance that catching companies travel between premises
reduces the number of premises that are potentially con-
nected, we also suggest controlling wide dissemination of
disease by encouraging premises to use local catching
companies and slaughterhouses.
If between species transmission occurs, then this has
implications for the potential for large epidemics as multi-
species sites may play an important role in the connectiv-
ity of otherwise separate sectors of the poultry industry,
though expert opinion suggests that they are only likely to
interact at the local level. This makes a difference to the
maximum number of premises that may be connected
and hence gives rise to the importance of further investi-
gations into this area.
Methods
Literature review
A literature review was undertaken in order to research the
British poultry industry and to identify potential between
farm transmission routes of AIV. The results were collated
with expert opinion and categorised into sub-populations
within the poultry industry that may connect poultry
premises.
Construction of contact structures
A series of epidemiological contact structures were con-
structed in which commercial poultry premises are linked
by potentially infectious contacts. The potential contacts
between premises were informed by a NEEG/CERA
(National Epidemiology Emergency Group/Centre for
Epidemiology and Risk Analysis, Defra) data collection
exercise, in which slaughterhouses and catching compa-
nies were approached to provide a list of the premises
from which they collect birds and the species involved,
and a sample of single and multi-site companies were sent
a questionnaire on which they were asked for details
about the frequency and type of movements from their
premises. In addition, the poultry register (GBPR) data
provided details on the location and species numbers in
each poultry premises in GB housing more than 50 birds.
The data in the network database were compared to the
GBPR as well as to data obtained from the Food Standards
Evidence of geographic isolation for transmission networks generated when the probability of transmission via catching compa- nies passes through p = 0.05 Figure 9
Evidence of geographic isolation for transmission networks generated when the probability of transmission via catching compa-
nies passes through p = 0.05. Size of the GC at just below and just above the transition.BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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Agency and expert opinion [Jason Gittins, Howard Hellig,
Ian Brown] in order to determine how representative the
network database is of the contact structures being ana-
lysed.
Potentially infectious links between premises could occur
either as a result of premises:
1. using the same catching company, or
2. using the same slaughterhouse, or
3. belonging to the same multi-site company, or
4. environmental spread within a 3 km radius of poultry
premises.
We assumed that premises could be linked by catching
company or multi-site companies by the direct move-
ments of people (catching teams or company personnel),
vehicles or equipment between poultry premises. For
slaughterhouses, connections between premises can occur
when slaughterhouse vehicles and equipment are used on
multiple premises to collect birds. Vehicles may visit mul-
tiple premises en-route to the slaughterhouse, possibly
connecting farms and transmitting infection, or they may
return to a slaughterhouse between visits to premises. The
use of slaughterhouse vehicles and equipment in the
transportation of birds to slaughter can connect farm to
slaughterhouse to farm, or farm to farm to slaughter-
house.
A radius of 3 km was chosen to be limit for environmental
transmission, based on small probabilities of transmis-
sion of AIV via this route [31]. A 3 km radius is also the
radius of the protection zone put around infected
premises in GB, during an outbreak situation.
Under the assumptions made, maximum connectivity
between premises is represented in the contact structures.
A potential epidemic supported by such a contact struc-
ture could be considered the worst-case scenario.
Contact structure analysis
Having identified the contact structures to be analysed,
the number of nodes and links were calculated for each
type of potentially infectious link. The four contact struc-
tures were analysed using a simulation programme. The
programme, written in C language, uses Tarjan's algo-
rithm [33] to find the largest component within the given
contact structure such that any premises in that compo-
nent can be reached directly, or indirectly, by any other
premises. This output represents an upper limit to the size
of a potential epidemic that may occur as a result of trans-
mission of disease via a particular transmission mecha-
nism. The probability of a link occurring between two
premises, which was varied between zero and one, repre-
sents the probability of transmission of disease.
Initially, the worst-case scenario was considered, where all
links result in potentially infectious contacts. In order to
test the sensitivity of the results to the assumption that all
links result in potentially infectious contacts, the effects
that removing key-players from the network have on the
size of the GC was considered, as well as the effect of
restricting poultry premises to the use of only one slaugh-
terhouse, chosen at random from a list of slaughterhouses
used by the premises.
Sensitivity analysis
It should be noted that the sensitivity analysis performed
here is used to investigate the impact of changes (e.g.
restrictions on distance travelled by catching teams) on
the properties of contact structures. By considering certain
properties of the contact structures, we can investigate the
relative sensitivity of the contact structure properties
under different scenarios. In order to determine the rela-
tive importance of each contact structure, we consider
how the degree distribution (the number links per
premises) varies as the importance of the contact structure
changes. The "importance" can be varied by varying the
probability of a link occurring between two premises
within the contact structure.
The sensitivity of the GC to the following scenarios was
explored and areas for further data collection identified:
1. Limiting the number of slaughterhouses to one per
premises: Slaughterhouses generally do not slaughter
multiple species. By limiting the number of slaughter-
houses used per premises, we were able to determine the
effect that premises housing multiple species have on the
connectivity of the contact structure represented by
slaughterhouses, as such premises are the ones likely to be
sending birds to multiple slaughterhouses. Where
premises are recorded as sending birds to multiple slaugh-
terhouses, one slaughterhouse was chosen at random.
2. Treating multi-species sites as separate epidemiological
units: Different species housed on the same site are treated
as separate epidemiological units, categorised into the five
principal sectors of the British poultry industry: meat
chicken, commercial layer, turkey, duck and goose indus-
tries [34]. We assume that between-species transmission
can only occur via local (i.e. short distance) spread and
not via slaughterhouse or catching company transmis-
sion. Under these assumptions, the impact that the possi-
bility of cross-species contamination, particularly on
multi-species farms, could have on the potential for dis-
ease transmission was explored.BMC Veterinary Research 2008, 4:27 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1746-6148/4/27
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3. Imposing a maximum distance that any catching team
can travel between two poultry premises: The Euclidean
distance between two potentially connected premises was
calculated, and the link could only result in disease trans-
mission if two premises are within a given distance of each
other (distances of 25 km and 50 km were tested). This
analysis revealed the importance of obtaining more
detailed catching company and slaughterhouse data.
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